In any enhanced effort to probe the future, intelligence organisations, particularly their analytical wings, would seemingly have a very important role to play. For helping policy officials to 'anticipate unwelcome contingencies' has always been among their bedrock missions. These organisations have pursued this responsibility in two broad ways: strategic assessment and warning .
• Strategic assessment: the production of formal analyses of future trends and possible developments. These tend to be evidence and/or theory based, and usually feature probabilistic judgements highlighting the likeliest outcomes and their implications -although often with some attention to less probable developments. US National Intelligence Estimates are exemplars of this genre.
• Warning: the 'gold standard' of intelligence anticipation, warning involves the issuance of alerts about potential 'unwelcome contingencies' that are designed to be 'actionable' -to elicit policy responses. Warning may be strategic -alerts issued at a somewhat distant temporal remove from the expected event that aim to prompt preventive action or enhance readiness -or tactical where the aim is to be sufficiently specific about 'where, when, what, and how' to prompt the immediate mobilisation of available resources. Warning is embedded in most types of intelligence production but can (as in the United States) also involve a dedicated system in which 'early-warning indicators' are monitored for possible escalation of the danger posed by a pre-identified threat (see, e.g., Grabo, 2004).
Whatever the specific process employed, the expectation of the general public, many policy officials and, to a considerable extent, intelligence organisations themselves, is that intelligence should strive and be able to provide specific predictions -particularly of a tactical nature -of coming dangers that can help to head off 'strategic surprise.' But intelligence organisations has been most heavily held to account for alleged failures to make correct 'calls' on what have later turned out to be harmful-to-disastrous developments. From the World War II era onwards, there have been repeated failures by intelligence organisations around the globe -including highly capable ones -to predict various types of events: surprise military and terrorist attacks such as Pearl Harbor, the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, and 9/11; major internal upheavals such as the 1979 Iranian revolution, and game-changing political events, such as the 1998 Indian nuclear test (see, e.g., Kam, 2004 ; Chapter 3 in this book). To be sure, there have been known predictive successes as well (and perhaps many less-recognised ones also, because warning successes produce nonevents that do not register with publics or with commissions of inquiry) and some failures have arguably turned out, on close academic inspection, to be more nuanced than widely believed, especially insofar as intelligence
